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ABSTRACT 
The enlisted personnel assignment process is a major part in the United States 
Navy’s Personnel Distribution system. It ensures warfighters and supporting activities 
receive the right sailor with the right training to the right billet at the right time (R4) and 
is a critical element in meeting the challenges of Seapower 21 and Global CONOPS. In 
order to attain these optimal goals the ways-to-do-it need to be customer-centered and 
should optimize both, the Navy’s needs and the sailor’s interests. Recent studies and a 
detailing pilot in 2002 used a web-based marketplace with two-sided matching 
mechanisms to accomplish this vision. 
This research examines the introduction of an Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) as 
part of the U.S. Navy’s enlisted personnel assignment process in a simulation 
environment. It uses a previously developed simulation tool, including the Deferred 
Acceptance (DA) and the Linear Programming (LP) matching algorithm to simulate the 
assignment process.  
The results of the sensitivity analysis suggested that the Navy should mainly 
emphasize sailor quality rather than saving AIP funds in order to maximize utility and the 
possible matches. When adopting such an introduction policy also the percentage of 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
“There must be some other stimulus, besides love for their country, to make men 
fond of service…” 
    George Washington, 1732-1799 
 
“If love of money were the mainspring of all American action, the officer corps 
long since would have disintegrated.” 
    The Armed Forces Offices, 1950 (Heinl, 1966) 
 
The two quotations above represent two extreme positions on the same topic. Pay 
and compensation for serving in the military services is not the only incentive but it is 
certainly a factor one should not forget to consider thoroughly when talking about 
soldiers and their motivation for service. This summer the United States Navy is 
introducing a wage differential for serving in an unpopular location or billet with the 
Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP).  
The principles of an all-volunteer force are to recruit the volunteers with the 
lowest opportunity costs and those who are most willing to serve. The initial step, 
recruiting volunteers into military service, is already in place. However, the internal labor 
market represented by the Navy’s enlisted personnel assignment system does not 
necessarily follow this premise. Sailors are often involuntarily assigned to unpopular duty 
stations in hard to fill billets. As a logical result, the Sailors’ differences in personal 
preferences are usually not sufficiently included in the assignment decision. The 
important allocation function of the wage as the price of labor is not implemented to 
reflect willingness to accept the job, and a legally binding order replaces the market 
mechanism. Consequentially, this creates negative experiences of involuntary, hardly 
understandable assignments causing some sailors to decide not to reenlist. The intrinsic 
motivation potential might also suffer severely. A market-based system that matches 
sailors’ and command’s preferences and includes wage differentials with respect to 
2 
individual preferences could significantly reduce the negative side effects of centralized 
assignment. 
To fulfill this urgent demand for flexibility and to counter the market 
inefficiencies of hierarchical planning Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) was proposed to 
represent the crucial allocation function of prices in an internal labor market (CNA, 
2000). Offering additional flexible compensation to volunteers will incorporate individual 
preferences in the assignment process, which ensures the assignment of those with the 
lowest opportunity costs and the highest willingness to serve at a particular duty station. 
Because the size of the incentive is determined by closed bidding procedures, a resulting 
individual market wage will also provide signals for budget allocation. The question “Is 
this billet really worth the pay?” is more easily answered and the overall monetary 
compensation for a billet is more easily compared to civilian market competition.  
 
B. PURPOSE 
Can this additional wage premium in the form of AIP improve performance of the 
Assignment process for the Navy’s Enlisted Personnel, and what is the right policy to 
introduce the new AIP? These are the main questions that led to the research and 
development of this research. In absence of real world statistical data about the 
introduction and initial success of the AIP, a simulation analysis is conducted to find 
appropriate suggestions. To simulate the assignment process, the Navy Enlisted 
Distribution Simulator (NEDSim) is used and adapted for this research. Necessary 
amendments included changing the profile generator, the utility functions and the 
performance measures. Although the NEDSim-provided matching mechanisms are 
currently not employed by the Navy to match Enlisted Personnel to job openings, they 




C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Questions  
• Does Assignment Incentive Pay increase the performance of the 
Navy’s enlisted personnel assignment process in a simulation 
environment? 
• What is the most effective implementation strategy? 
 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• How can AIP be included in the Navy Enlisted Distribution 
Simulator (NEDSim)? 
• Using different implementation scenarios, does AIP improve the 
performance results of the simulation? 
 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATION 
1. Scope 
The scope includes: 
• An overview of the U.S. Navy enlisted assignment process, 
including a brief review of advantages of a web-based marketplace 
for the assignment process 
• A brief description of the principles of an Assignment Incentive Pay 
(AIP) within the compensation system and an introduction into the 
Navy’s pilot project 
• A short review of utility functions in two-sided matching simulations 
• A review of the earlier developed Navy Enlisted Distribution 
Simulator (NEDSim), including the used matching algorithms 
• The introduction of amendments and necessary changes to NEDSim 
4 
• The simulation design and its results in terms of command utility, 
percent matches and blocking pairs 
• Inferring a practicable introduction policy scenario for the 
Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) from the simulation results 
 
2. Limitation  
The research is limited to the enlisted personnel assignment process in a 
simulation environment. The profile generation is based on data from research on the 
Aviation Support Technician (AS) rating and might not be representative for other 
communities or officers. Additionally, the distribution of the AIP is assumed to be 
normal and might not reflect the actual spread of AIP over the existing billets. 
 
E. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This thesis will provide further insights into the effects of an Assignment 
Incentive Pay in the enlisted assignment process of the U.S. Navy. It will also provide 
suggestions for an implementation policy to maximize the Navy’s utility derived from the 
implementation. 
 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
The thesis research is organized in the following steps: 
• Conduct literature research including books, magazines, power-point 
briefings and library data bases 
• Participate in the 3rd Annual Navy Workforce Research and Analysis 
Conference 
• Review the U.S. Navy enlisted personnel assignment process 
• Discuss a compensation system for the Navy including an 
Assignment Incentive Pay 
5 
• Review and revise the Navy Enlisted Distribution Simulator 
(NEDSim) 
• Conduct sensitivity analysis with the simulation and obtain detailed 
results 
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. NAVY ENLISTED 
ASSIGNMENT PROCESS 
A. THE MANPOWER, PERSONNEL AND TRAINING SYSTEM 
The United States Navy Manpower, Personnel and Training System can be 
generally divided into two major parts. United States Navy missions in support of 
military strategy define Manpower Requirements, which lead to Manpower 
Programming, which are referred to as the “spaces” or the Manpower process in the 
MPT-system. These “spaces” describe the required End Strength and Fiscal constraints 
for the Navy’s Personnel. The second part is referred to as the Personnel or “faces” 
portion, consisting of Personnel Planning and Personnel Distribution. The final product 
of this complex cycle is force readiness in support of national security and military 





Figure 1.   The U.S. Navy Manpower, Personnel and Training System (From: Manpower, 



























Personnel Distribution is the last process of this complex system before it begins 
its cycle again. The enlisted personnel assignment sub-process plays a major role in the 
United States Navy’s Personnel Distribution system. Its measure of success, providing 
the right sailor with the right training to the right billet at the right time (R4), is crucial to 
supporting Naval Force readiness and meeting the challenging future. This research will 
therefore focus on this sub-process of the MPT-Cycle.  
The personnel distribution process basically consists of three sub-processes 
forming the “Distribution Triad” (Hatch, 2002). These three sub-processes are 
Allocation, Placement and Assignment, each having their own responsible “players” and 
information-systems. 
 
1. The Allocation Sub-Process 
The Navy Personnel Command (NPC) is the responsible authority for allocation 
management within the personnel Distribution process. It first identifies sailors projected 
to rotate to a new assignment within the next nine months, excludes non-distributable 
inventory from the process, and allocates the distributable inventory to the four Manning 
Control Authorities (CINCLANT, CINCPAC, BUPERS, Reserve). Non-distributable 
inventory includes transients, prisoners, patients and holdees, sailors in training and other 
personnel not assignable. To ensure a prioritized balance of the distributable inventory, 
NPC uses billet information from the Total Force Manpower Management System 
(TFMMS) and the Enlisted Master File (EMF), which already includes manning policy, 
to determine requisition priority. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) determines 
manning priorities 1 and 2 while priority 3 reflects the MCA’s interests. That way, the 
resulting Navy Manning Plan (NMP) reflects a “Fair Share” of the prioritized 


















Navy Manning Plan 
(NMP) 
“The Fair Share” 
 
 
Figure 2.   The Allocation Sub-Process (After: Ho, 2002) 
 
 
2. The Placement Sub-Process 
As the second part in the distribution triad, the placement sub-process follows 
allocation management. The major player here is the Enlisted Placement Management 
Center (EPMAC), which acts as a principal agent for the commands using the Navy 
Manning Plan to provide the detailers in the assignment sub-process with requisitions in 
the Enlisted Personnel Requisition System (EPRES). In doing so, EPMAC negotiates the 
equitably spread over activities with the ultimate goal of having the right sailor at the 
right time in the right place with the right skills (R4). Also included in the placement sub-





Navy Manning Plan 
Projections about 
Activities 





















3. The Assignment Sub-Process 
In the final step of the triad, the prioritized requisitions are filled with sailors 
meeting the specifications. The assignment officers, commonly known as “detailers”, 
match people and billets with regard to the Sailor’s needs as well as the Navy’s needs. 
In doing so, the detailers try to optimize readiness and stability for the Navy’s 
activities and provide equal opportunity for the sailors getting their desired assignment. 
The detailers use the prioritized requisition information provided by EPRES, which is 
further passed on to the Enlisted Assignment Info System (EAIS), to determine the 
demand side of this process; the sailors, as the supply side, provide their preferences in 
the Job Advertising and Selection System (JASS).  JASS was introduced in 1995 and is 
an online information and decision support system that helps the US-Navy Sailors, 
wherever they are, get information about current job offers and apply for jobs in a 
prioritized list. This information system avoids long negotiations over the telephone and 
helps to decrease disadvantages for sailors assigned to ships or remote locations who 
have limited opportunities to contact their detailer about available billets (Short, 2000). 
Every Sailor is permitted to view JASS via the BUPERS Homepage and to update their 
knowledge about job availabilities from any Internet connection around the world. Job 
applications, however, can only be made by Command Career Counselors for the 
individual sailor. Command Career Counselors (CCCs) serve a two sided quality control 
function. On one side they’re ensuring the eligibility of the applying sailor for the desired 
job and on the other side they’re advising the sailor about career and job application 












Figure 4.   The Personnel Distribution Process (From: Hatch, 2002) 
 
 
As described above, the detailer is the principal agent (Ho, 2002) and the sailor’s 
advocate in the assignment sub-process. With a cycle-time of two weeks, detailers 
eventually assign about 45 sailors to 60 billets during this period. Besides considering 
mandatory attributes of the sailor, such as rate, rating, Navy Enlisted Classification 
(NEC), gender, Projection Rotation Date (PRD), sea-shore rotation cycles and security 
classification, the detailer should also minimize monetary expenditures, such as 
permanent Change of Station costs (PCS), while on the other hand maximizing the 
sailors’ satisfaction for their next assignment. This process is additionally complicated 
with numerous and changing policies by the DOD, CNO, MCA and CNPC.  
Once the assignment decision is made, orders are issued electronically through the 
Enlisted Assignment Information System (EAIS). Billet/sailor matches for rate E-5 and 
above are additionally scanned by EPMAC for fit and policy performance. Sailors or 






























B. ADVANTAGES OF A WEB-BASED MARKETPLACE TO ASSIGN 
ENLISTED PERSONNEL 
Although the detailers are doing their best to fulfill multiple stakeholder 
requirements, there still remain some areas for improvement in the process. Top-priority 
billets might not be on the top of the sailor’s preference list and undesirable jobs might 
have to be filled. If this is the case, the transparency and logic of the assignment process 
gains incredible advantages by improving the sailor’s acceptance of an unwanted job and 
location. With only the detailer finally deciding on how to balance all interests, both 
sailors and commands perceive the assignment process to be subjective and often distrust 
the detailers. Sailors also value the detailing process itself as more important than the 
actual outcome. Especially because they understand that their primary job or location of 
choice might not be the Navy’s first priority, they expect honesty, timeliness and 
reasonable explanations with their new orders (Short, 2000). 
 
1. Disadvantages And Inefficiencies In The Current Assignment Sub-
Process 
The current assignment process is highly labor intensive with about 294 enlisted 
detailers responsible for about 330,000 enlisted personnel (Ho, 2002). The detailers are 
trying to spread the scarce commodity “Sailor” evenly across the four Manning Control 
Authorities. A possible intervention in the process for ratings E-5 and above by EPMAC, 
which actually happens in about 3% of these assignments, makes the process even more 
burdensome. As a human being facing all these numerous and in part volatile 
requirements, the detailer naturally is subject to human error and might make out-of-the-
moment sub-optimal decisions. Additionally, command career counselors are sometimes 
unfamiliar with all ratings (approximately 90), and there is rarely an alternate counselor 
present in their absence, so detailers have to spend significant time counseling via phone 
instead of career planning. On the demand side, a certain amount of mistrust arises from 
perceived subjectivity in the process, generating numerous phone calls from commands 
to detailers emphasizing the importance of filling a certain billet. 
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In addition to the psychological disadvantages of a centrally planned internal 
labor market, such as the Navy’s enlisted assignment process, Market inefficiencies from 
textbook economics are obvious. Hierarchical planning and assigning jobs to people 
always incorporates the risk of sub-optimal solutions.  
In a market-based labor market, demand and supply of labor are balanced by the 
important function of the wage as the price of labor. The employee, being the supplier of 
labor, and the employer, as the demanding side, agree on a certain wage. For this “price” 
the job seeker is willing to provide work and the company with the job offer is willing to 
employ it.  
This commonly known simple model of a labor-market mechanism leads to an 
equilibrium quantity of labor employed at an equilibrium wage. The general properties 
are displayed in Figure 5: 
 
 
Figure 5.   Market-Based Labor Markets (From: Gates, 2001) 
 
 
Although this model represents the basic principles of the external labor market, 
not many private firms use it to assign their employees to new jobs. The matching of 
 








potential candidates to available jobs often follows the need of the moment or 
hierarchical planning, like the Navy’s enlisted assignment process.  
As a logical result, the Sailors’ differences in personal preferences are usually not 
sufficiently included in the assignment decision. The important allocation function of 
wages as the price of labor is not implemented to reflect willingness to accept the job, 
and a legally binding order replaces the market mechanism. Consequentially, this creates 
negative experiences of involuntary, hardly understandable assignments and some sailors 
might decide not to reenlist. The intrinsic motivation potential might also suffer severely.  
A market-based system that matches sailors’ and command’s preferences and 
includes wage differentials with respect to individual preferences could significantly 
reduce the negative side effects of centralized assignment. 
 
2. Possible Improvements By A Market-Based Matching System 
Mechanisms to reduce the above described negative impacts, which have been 
used in the past and reflect both sides of interest in a labor market, are two-sided 
matching agents. Three different approaches have been in use to assign several job 
seekers to several jobs. These approaches are Deferred Acceptance (DA), Linear 
Programming (LP) and the Priority approach. The most important algorithms still 
employed are the former two. The DA mechanism generally guarantees stable matches of 
jobs and job seekers and is currently used in the U.S. to assign medical students to 
residency programs (Gates, 2001); the LP-model is used in British hospitals and 
incorporates the risk of unstable matches (Ho, 2002). An unstable match describes the 
specific situation where an algorithm produced match leaves room for a mutually 
preferable choice for both parties. However, LP does not merely create matches from 
priority lists of employers and job seekers, but can maximize overall utility of both. 
Details for the mechanisms of both algorithms will be given in chapter five. The use of an 
agent-based system as a tool to provide the detailer with objective information about 
optimal matching solutions will improve the process in two ways: It provides 
transparency for sailor and commands, and it decreases the possibility of inefficiencies 
through out-of-the-moment solutions. 
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In addition to a computer-based matching system as a tool for the detailer to find 
an overall optimal solution, introducing wage differentials in the Navy’s Enlisted 
Personnel internal job market will incorporate the individual sailor’s preferences in the 
assignment process. The Navy usually accomplishes this with bonuses in addition to the 
rank-related salaries. 
 
3. Current Incentive Pay Models 
Most commonly used bonus systems in the Navy’s Enlisted Personnel community 
are Enlistment Bonuses (EB) and Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRB). While 
Enlistment Bonus Strategies usually offer advantageous loans for college education or 
lump sum up front monetary incentives, SRB’s are financial incentives to stay in the 
Navy. Both incentive systems encourage Sailors to make an enlistment or reenlistment 
decision to fulfill recruiting requirements or to maintain sufficiently high retention.  
These strategies attempt to influence the external labor market supply curve, but 
up to 2003 no incentive pay existed to reflect personal preferences in internal labor 
market decisions. Beginning in April 2003, the Navy is filling this gap with an 
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III. FUTURE FORCE COMPENSATION STARTEGY 
A. THE RIGHT COMPENSATION SYSTEM 
The assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, the 
honorable William A. Navas Jr., in his opening comments at the Third Annual Navy 
Workforce Research and Analysis Conference (2003), emphasized that the future vision 
for a Naval Warrior includes cost-effective use of all human resources and the 
employment of a qualified and motivated work force. This also means efficient 
compensation as a motivator and management tool.  
Following this guideline, the Center For Naval Analyses examined the present 
compensation system for the Navy’s enlisted personnel and identified four major 
purposes for an effective compensation system (CNA, 2000): 
 
Figure 6.   What should a compensation system do? (From: CNA, 2000) 
 
They concluded that three of these goals, namely “attracting and retaining enough 
people”, “promoting equity” and “providing subsistence”, are very well met by the 
And do all this
at the lowest
Possible cost!




• Motivate effective work
• Allocate workers among jobs
• Organization-specific goals
- Maintain pay equity
- Provide subsistence
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Navy’s current compensation system. However, the allocation of people across jobs and 
the purpose of attracting and retaining people in some critical skill areas aren’t very well 
met. The same study also counters the common equity argument against assignment and 
occupational differential with the fact that pay differentials already exist and do create 
differences. Special pays, like sea, submarine, nuclear pay or pay variations for doctors,  
as well as housing and subsistence allowances pay differentials by marital status, 
introduce significant differences. These already existing differentials target certain groups 
and not general problems of filling certain billets in unpopular locations. Instead, non-
monetary incentives are in place that put additional constraints on the distribution system 
and lower overall fleet readiness. The use of sea duty credits as an incentive for overseas 
shore billets is an example.  
Additionally, in times of a flourishing economy, a low retention and high Sailor 
dissatisfaction represent serious challenges to the Navy’s personnel system. Other 
challenges involve future forecasts, as the requirements for enlisted personnel change. 
With new platforms and civilian educational trends, the skill requirements for the 
workforce will also change. Although some uncertainty exists as to what technical skills 
will be required, it is generally agreed that the future sailor will have to apply general 
principles in technical fields, define problems, establish facts, draw conclusions and 
communicate technical problems and solutions (CNA, 2000). These changes in 
technology and skill requirements, together with changes in the population’s educational 
structure, like a greater portion of the population attending college, will lead to an 
incompatibility with the current pyramidal form of Navy manpower requirements and 
grade structure. Some junior-grades will have to complete less skilled tasks, but the vast 
majority of enlisted personnel will be skilled technical decision-makers. As a result, 
differentiating through fast promotion may no longer be an opportunity and lateral entries 
may create additional frictions to career expectations. The rather inflexible current 
compensation system might not be able to reward the needed increased technical skills 
and retention, and motivation could suffer severely. A more flexible compensation and 
career structure is unavoidable to successfully meet these future challenges. 
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B. AN ASSIGNMENT INCENTIVE PAY 
1. General Principles and Sailor Responsiveness 
The principles of an all-volunteer force is to recruit the volunteers with the lowest 
opportunity costs and those who are most willing to serve. In the initial step, getting 
volunteers into military service, these principles are indeed in place and working. 
However, the internal labor market represented by the Navy’s Enlisted Personnel 
Assignment system does not necessarily follow this premise. Sailors are often being 
assigned to duty stations involuntarily in unpopular hard to fill billets.  
 To fulfill the earlier described urgent demand for flexibility and to counter the 
market inefficiencies of hierarchical planning, an Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) was 
proposed to represent the crucial allocation function of prices in an internal labor market 
(CNA, 2002). Offering additional flexible compensation to volunteers will incorporate 
individual preferences in the assignment process and ensure the assignment of those with 
the lowest opportunity costs and the highest willingness to serve at a particular duty 
station. Because the height of the incentive will be determined by closed bidding 
procedures, the resulting individual market wage will also provide signals for budget 
allocation. The question “Is this billet really worth the pay?” is more easily answered and 
the overall monetary compensation for a billet is more easily compared to civilian market 
competition.  
The overall sailor responsiveness to an assignment incentive pay can only be 
estimated at this point, but actual data will be available by the beginning of 2004, along 
with the experience of the first AIP pilot program with oversea billets in Europe. 
However, surveys and studies by the CNA (2002) used historical data to infer that sailors 
will volunteer for less preferred duty given a pay incentive. Estimated results based on 
experiences with sea pay indicate incentives are required in the area of $ 50,000 per 





2. The Assignment Incentive Pay Pilot 
After over two years of studies and cost benefit analyses, the first AIP pilot 
started in mid-2003, offering Assignment Incentive Pay for overseas billets in Naples, 
Sigonella and Misawa. An Implementation Planning Team oversees the detailed rules and 
policies. Members are the MCAs, COMMANDER IN CHIEF U.S. Naval Forces Europe 
(CINCUSNAVEUR), NPC (PERS-4), EPMAC, OPNAV (N13), CNA, NPRST and 
contractors.  
The pilot will include enlisted sea-shore rotation ratings only. Sea credit will no 
longer be given for these oversea billets to gain significant pay back for the AIP 
expenses. After completing these assignments, the sailors will be available for sea duty 
again.  
The stated objective is to attract volunteers to difficult-to-fill jobs in the described 
locations (Cunningham, 2002). Although significant headroom is given with up to a 
$1500 per month incentive pay ceiling, the initial maxima are differentiated by location 
and pay grade: 
 
Table 1. AIP Maximum Rates by Pay grade and Location (From: Cunningham 2003) 
 
Location E7-9 E5-6 E4 
Sigonella $450 $400 $350 
Naples $450 $400 $350 
Misawa $200 $150 $100 
.  
 
These maxima reflect both the urgency that exists to fill the billet and the difficulty with 
filling the billet.  
To match sailors and jobs with the appropriate AIP, the sailors submit their bids 
through JASS in the Distributive Incentive Management System (DIMS). The bids are 
non-disclosed, so called sealed bids, in $50 increments. DIMS tracks and manages the 
allocation of monetary and non-monetary distribution incentives as well as activity 
manning and JASS vacancy. Forecasting modules allow expenditure and obligation 
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planning. Additionally, customized report tools enable data analysis at all desired 
reporting levels (Rouse, 2002). The following screenshot provides an impression of the 
planned software design: 
 
 




The bidding cycles are synchronized with the detailer’s current two-week 
requisition cycles. Although the detailers still make the final decision, they do not see any 
bids until all qualified bids are submitted ; they then add PCS and retraining costs to the 
equation. The decision rationale must follow the decision matrix and has to be 
documented if deviation from the lowest bid is unavoidable. If no qualified bid is 
received within the two-week’s cycle, the bidding will continue for another cycle, 
eventually with an increased maximum bid. Although, the decision matrix and the 
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business rules for an eventually unavoidable involuntarily assignment are still under 
development, the small start with Naples, Sigonella and Misawa is expected to be 
expanded after two to four requisition cycles. Figure 8 shows the estimated growth plan 
as of April 2003: 
 
Figure 8.   AIP Growth Plan (From: Cunningham, 2003) 
 
The Navy’s budget reflects the pilot as well as the further growth with 
installments of one million dollars in fiscal year (FY) 2003 up to 54 million dollars in 
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FY07. Program and IT layout will be evaluated before each step and adjustments will be 
made as necessary.  
Despite all the design efforts, sailor acceptance and responsiveness to this new 
incentive is crucial for its success. Although this incentive creates additional expenses at 
first, and will be added to PCS and training costs, the overall gain in sailor satisfaction 
and higher retention, particularly in times of economic booms, should yield sufficient 
return on investment. Due to the lack of survey data about the success of the brand new 
AIP, this paper will analyze the impact of AIP and its importance for the U.S. Navy in a 
simulation environment, using stylized utility functions for sailors and commands. The 
utility functions include AIP and weights that an individual sailor or the Navy might put 
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IV. UTILITY FUNCTIONS IN AGENT BASED TWO-SIDED 
MATCHING SIMULATIONS 
A. PREVIOUS SIMULATION DESIGN AND POSSIBLE CHANGES 
In the absence of real life data from the implemented pilot study, a simulation-
based sensitivity analysis is usually the only way to estimate success and give reasonable 
advice for an implementing strategy. In previous research, Low and Ho (2002) developed 
a powerful tool to compare the possible matching mechanisms. Their Navy Enlisted 
Distribution Simulator (NEDSIM) was implemented in Microsoft Excel with an 
advanced solver platform to facilitate the needs for several variables in the linear program 
(LP) as a matching mechanism. Both mechanisms, the deferred acceptance  (DA) 
algorithm as well as the LP, were used and compared across a variety of performance 
measures. Although the focus of this thesis is not to compare the two mechanisms, they 
both had advantages and disadvantages over each other. To cover all aspects of the 
assignment process replacing the human detailer in the simulation it seems adequate to 
keep both mechanisms and not to discard one or the other result. On the other hand, the 
focus of this thesis is different from Lo and How’s approach. While they investigated the 
strengths of the two matching mechanisms to ultimately decide on the most appropriate 
mechanism for a revised Navy Enlisted Distribution Assignment system, this research 
only uses simulation as a tool to replace the existing assignment system and examine the 
introduction of assignment incentive pay. 
As mentioned earlier, keeping both original matching mechanisms is an adequate 
choice to include all their individual advantages. While the LP has proven to perform 
better in the area of percent matches than the DA, the DA was significantly better in 
producing stable matches. Unstable matches are generally referred to as matches where 
both the matched sailor and the matched command would have preferred another 
matching partner over the assigned one. This situation would create a situation of 
instability with both matched partners trying to change the assignment.  
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 Other parts of the simulation however needed revision to adapt to this 
research. Along with these changes a central question occurs like in all simulations 
involving utilities: What is the appropriate form of the utility function? 
 
B. CONCEPT OF THE NEW UTILITY FUNCTION DESIGN 
In all previous simulations of the assignment process, utility functions of the 
commands and the sailors were used to generate preference lists and to apply the 
appropriate matching algorithms. The general choice between a multiplicative and an 
additive form has to be made to continue with the simulator design. The multiplicative 
form, also known as the Cobb Douglas utility function, implies interdependencies 
between the individual factors within the utility function. Changing the value of one part 
in the function changes the incremental value in another part. The individual elements in 
the utility function affect the incremental values of the other elements. Ng and Soh 
(2001) used this kind of utility function in their simulation. It followed the general form: 
 
U = Aα1 * Bα2 * Cα3 
where:  
U = Total utility of the sailor or command 
A, B, C = Utility derived from factors A,B,C 
Weights α1 + α2 + α3 = 1 
 
However, Low and Ho (2002) argued that this might not be a realistic relationship 
between the individual parts in the function. An increase of value from one part might not 
necessarily increase the incremental value of another one. They used an additive form 




U = α1A + α2B + α3C 
where:  
U   = Total utility of the sailor or command 
A, B, C   = Utility derived from factor A, B or C. 
α1 + α2 + α3 = 1 
This research will follow the latter approach because of the lack of evidence for 
the interrelationship amongst the utility function elements. In a realistic scenario of the 
assignment process, a sailor might have independent preferences for pecuniary or non-
pecuniary aspects of his future job. Then again, he might very well value the monetary 
aspect of his work more highly than all the other preference factors. The additive utility 
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V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW SIMULATION 
DESIGN IN THE NAVY ENLISTED DISTRIBUTION 
SIMULATOR (NEDSIM) 
A. THE ORIGINAL NEDSIM 
The original NEDSim included four components. It created a random list of both 
sailor and command preference factors using a profile generator. Using these lists and 
computing the resulting utility levels, it then assembled a sailor and a command 
preference list. Based on the two matching mechanisms it subsequently matched sailors 
to billets and finally provided summary reports of the simulation. 
 The following figure illustrates the links between components: 
 
Profile Generator 
Generation of Sailor Profiles 
Generation of Billet Profiles 
 
Preference List Generator 
 
Generate sailors’ preferences for billets & rank order list 
(Additive Utility Function) 
Generate billets’ preferences for sailors & rank order list 




Match sailors to billets based on the DA Algorithm 




Assign Sailors to Billets 
Compare Assignments between the DA and LP 
Algorithms 
 





The typical two weeks assignment requisition cycle tries to match about 45 sailors 
to 60 billets. About 15 percent of these billets are priority 1 coded and have to be filled 
first. The remaining billets have priority 2 or 3 and are considered thereafter. Sailors are 
permitted to submit five choices for their next command in a prioritized list in JASS as 
described in Chapter II. Following the reality NEDSim used preference lists with a length 
of five for sailors and commands. To gain statistically significant results, Low and Ho 
(2002) simulated 100 two-week requisition cycles. 
 
1. The Profile Generator 
Within the profile generator, NEDSim generates billet and sailor characteristics 
based on discrete probability distributions derived from the profile of the aviation 
community used for the simulation. Data from the Enlisted and Billet Master File was 
used to shape sailor and billet profiles and to determine the underlying probability 
distributions. 
 
a Sailor Profile   
Simulated sailor characteristics were grade, NEC, experience and 
performance. While the distribution of ranks was easily derived from the Enlisted Master 
File (EMF), NEC’s had to be grouped into five NEDSim categories to facilitate the 
simulation. The sailor from the aviation community could come from a variety of 
previous billets, resulting in a broad spectrum of possible experience. Shore assignments 
include AIMD detachments, recruiting commands, training commands and air wings, 
while sea billets exist on Aircraft Carriers (CV’s), amphibious ships (LHD’s, LHA’s) and 
mine command ships (MCS). Sailor characteristics and underlying probability 




Table 2. Probability Distribution of Sailor Characteristics (From: Ho, 2002) 
  
Characteristic Probability Distribution 
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b Billet Profile 
Billet characteristics included rate, location, NEC, promotional prospects 
of the assignment and whether it is ashore or at sea. Rate, provided by the Billet Master 
File (BMF) and locations were grouped into five main regional areas. NEC also was 
obtained from the BMF for the AS rated sailors. Promotional prospects or visibility, on 
the other hand, had to be estimated by the deviation of the billet rate from the sailor’s 
rate. A billet rate that is indeed much higher than the sailor’s rate represents high 
visibility and high promotion prospects. The existing number of billets was broken down 
into shore and sea characteristics according to their platform profile. Billet characteristics 
and probability distributions are given in Table 3: 
 
Table 3. Probability Distribution of Billet Characteristics (From: Ho, 2002) 
 
Characteristic Probability Distribution 










Location East Coast 
(CEC) 
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Platform Profile CV 
28% 
LPD / LHA /  













2. The Preference List Generator 
For every sailor, the simulation models a preference list of billets, and for every 
billet a preference list of sailors, using additive utility functions and the random number 
generator in MS Excel with the above mentioned discrete probability functions. 
Following Buttler and Molina’s (2002) research on preferences, the sailor’s utility 
function consisted of four preference factors, including family life, location, and job 
factors. Modeled in an additive utility function, NEDSim used the following equation: 
 
Sailor Utility  = αFL (Family Life) + αL (Location) + αJ1 (Promotion) 
+ αJ2 (Shore) 
where : αFL + αL+ αJ1+ αJ2 =1 
(each α is generated randomly)   
 
Family life was believed to be mainly determined by the spouse’s employment 
opportunities. Therefore, job growth rates were used to rank the five locations above in a 
general pay-off matrix. With a similar technique, costs of living in the different locations 
lead to a pay-off matrix for the location preference factor. Job factors, on the other hand, 
had to be split across two parts of the utility function: visibility and shore. While 
visibility was directly derived by comparing sailor and billet rank, shore was set to 
maximum utility for shore and minimum utility for sea. A summary of all four sailor pay-







Table 4. Pay-off for Sailor Preference Factors in the Sailor Utility Function (After: Ho, 
2002) 
 
 Score Family Life 
Billet Location 
(Job Growth Rates 
in repr. Cities) 
Location Factor  
Billet Location 
(Cost of Living 







Excellent 5 Gulf Coast (CGC) 
Pensacola (3.94%) 
Gulf Coast (CGC) 
Pensacola (94.9%) 
(Billet rate ≥ 2 rates 
above Sailor rate) 
yes 
High 4 East Coast (CEC) 
Norfolk (2.14%) 
East Coast (CEC) 
Norfolk (96.6%) 
(Billet rate = 1 rate above 
Sailor rate) 
 
Average 3 Southwest (CSW) 
San Diego (2.10%) 
OCONUS (OPL) (Billet rate = Sailor rate)  




(Billet rate  = 1 rate 
below Sailor rate) 
 
Low 1 OCONUS (OPL) Southwest (CSW) 
San Diego (136.4%) 
(Billet rate ≤ 2 rates 
below Sailor rate) 
no 
 
While the out of continental U.S. (OCONUS) location was perceived to have the 
lowest job growth rate compared with the United States, it was assigned an average 
utility score for the cost of living. Although applying for a job with a rate more than one 
pay grade lower or higher than the sailor’s is not realistic, NEDSim covered the whole 
spectrum and assigned low command utility to the big rate differences to reflect reality. 
Not knowing how the individual sailor perceives the importance of the different 
preference factors, the weights α were determined randomly in excel. 
Butler and Molina (2002) not only surveyed the preferences of the sailor in the 
matching process but also asked the other side of the process – the commands- about 
their preferences. As a result, the most important preference factors for the commands 
were found to be the sailor’s NEC, pay grade, experience and past performance, resulting 
in the following utility function: 
Command Utility = βNEC(NEC) + βpay(Paygrade) + βexp (Experience) 
+ βperf (Performance) 
where : βNEC + βpay+ βexp+ βperf=1  
(each β is generated randomly)   
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The correct NEC was perceived to be very important and is determined to be a 
binary attribute leaving no room for more than two levels. Consequently the correct NEC 
was assigned maximum score and any deviation was assigned a minimum score. As 
mentioned earlier, sailors actually cannot apply for jobs with a pay grade more than one 
level different from their current grade. Also a higher pay grade of the sailor includes less 
promotional obligation on the Navy’s side. NEDSim therefore assigned the highest score 
to a correct pay grade and the lowest score to a pay grade one below. A pay grade one 
above received an average score. For the experience factor, the present and future 
platforms were compared. A sailor who came from the same platform to which he was 
supposed to go scored a 5. A sailor who stayed on sea or shore duty received a 3 and a 
sailor who had to change platform and duty type received a 1. The performance factor 
was generated in five categories with a normal distribution. Table 5 summarizes the pay-
off for command preference factors: 
 
Table 5. Pay-off for Sailor Preference Factors in the Command Utility Function (After: 
Ho, 2002) 
 
Score NEC Paygrade Experience Performance
5 Correct 





(Sailor Unit = Billet Unit) 
Early 
Promote 
4 -- -- -- Must 
Promote 
3 -- One above Somewhat relevant 
(Sailor Sea/Shore = Billet Sea/Shore) 
Promotable 
2 -- -- -- Progressing 
1 Incorrect 





(Sailor Sea/Shore ≠ Billet Sea/Shore) 
Not Promote 
 
3. Matching Algorithm 
NEDSim employed two matching mechanisms to compare their performance in 
the simulated assignment process. The deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) is widely 
used to match medical interns and hospitals in the United Sates and Great Britain, and the 
linear program algorithm (LP) is used in Newcastle and Birmingham hospitals (Ho, 
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2002). Both algorithms will be described briefly with an emphasis on the Navy 
assignment process application. 
 
a The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm 
As a prerequisite for applying the deferred acceptance algorithm, both 
types of potential matching partners have to have a rank-order profile. The preference 
lists of sailors and commands serving that purpose. In the next step, the bias-determining 
side “proposes” to her most preferred partner. The mechanism was first introduced by 
Gale and Shapely (1962) who used marriage partners as an example. Some terminology 
to describe the algorithm from this original example is still widely used. Also the 
immanent mechanism bias needs to be pre-defined. In our case, a sailor bias would give 
the sailor side the first priority to choose its most preferred partner. Each command that 
has the proposing sailor in its preference list accepts the proposal temporarily. In the case 
that two sailors have chosen the same command in the iteration step, the sailor who is 
most preferred by that command will be temporarily accepted. All other proposals are 
rejected. The remaining sailors are then moved down their preference list to repeat the 
process. Each command holds only the best sailor’s proposal with respect to its 
preference list. When none of the proposals are rejected any more, the algorithm stops 
and the deferred accepted matches become realized matches. The following example 
illustrates the mechanism: 
Suppose five Sailors, Sn with n= 1,2,3,4,5, have issued preference Lists 
with the length of 6 and eight commands, Cm with m=1,2…8, have preference lists 
containing 5 sailors each. The deferred acceptance algorithm would run through the 







Step 1: The sailors’ first choices are proposed. Sailor 3 and sailor 4’s proposals are 
temporarily accepted. Sailors 1, 2 and 5 have proposed to the same command as sailor 4, 
but they are lower on the command’s preference list and therefore were refused. 
 
Step 2: The sailors’ second choices are proposed. Sailor 2 and sailor 5’s proposals are 
temporarily accepted. Sailor 1 has proposed to the same command as sailor 2, but he is 





Sailor #1 Sailor #2 Sailor #3 Sailor #4 Sailor #5
6 6 2 6 6
3 3 5 8 8
4 4 7 3 3
8 8 3 4 4
2 2 4 1 2
5 5 6 2 5
Comd #1 Comd #2 Comd #3 Comd #4 Comd #5 Comd #6 Comd #7 Comd #8
2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2
5 5 5 5 5 2 4 1
1 1 1 1 4 3 1 4
4 4 4 4 1 1 3 3
3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5
Sailor 5Sailor 4Sailor 3Sailor 2Sailor 1
6 6 2 6 6
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Step 3: The remaining sailor 1’s third choice is proposed. He is not rejected because he is 
on his third choice command’s preference list. No offers are rejected at this step and the 
temporary acceptances become permanent matches. 
 
Figure 10.   Preference lists and iterative steps under the DA (After: Gates, 2002) 
Sailor #1 Sailor #2 Sailor #3 Sailor #4 Sailor #5
6 6 2 6 6
3 3 5 8 8
4 4 7 3 3
8 8 3 4 4
2 2 4 1 2
5 5 6 2 5
Comd #1 Comd #2 Comd #3 Comd #4 Comd #5 Comd #6 Comd #7 Comd #8
2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2
5 5 5 5 5 2 4 1
1 1 1 1 4 3 1 4
4 4 4 4 1 1 3 3
3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5







Sailor #1 Sailor #2 Sailor #3 Sailor #4 Sailor #5
6 6 2 6 6
3 3 5 8 8
4 4 7 3 3
8 8 3 4 4
2 2 4 1 2
5 5 6 2 5
Comd #1 Comd #2 Comd #3 Comd #4 Comd #5 Comd #6 Comd #7 Comd #8
2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2
5 5 5 5 5 2 4 1
1 1 1 1 4 3 1 4
4 4 4 4 1 1 3 3
3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5









The DA algorithm produces the stable pairs (S1,C4), (S2,C3), (S3,C2), (S4,C6) and 
(S5,C8) in a sailor-biased run. A command-biased run would have yielded minor 
differences with sailor 1 being assigned to command 8 rather than 4 and sailor 5 assigned 
to command 4 rather than command 8. As described earlier, the DA does not allow for 
unstable matches. No matched pair will mutually try to change the assignment. 
 
b The Linear Programming 
The LP also uses the preference lists for its mechanism. While original 
versions of the algorithm have assigned weights to priority ranks and tried to maximize 
the combined weights of the matched pairs, Ho and Low (2002) used the utility values for 
sailors and commands directly. Any possible match between commands on the sailor’s 
preference list and sailors on the command’s preference list have an assigned combined 
utility value for this match. Using the denotation of the example above, the problem can 
be expressed as follows: 
 
Max SCSCU Ξ∑  
 Subject to: SCU = 0.5 US + 0.5 UC  (Combined sailor and command utility) 
   [ ]1,0∈Ξ SC  for all Sn, Cm 
with SCΞ  being a binary variable indicating if a match occurs. 
 
Unlike the DA algorithm, the LP will not generally avoid unstable 
matches because the sum of the combined utilities of all possible matches might be 
higher including these constellations. The number of unstable matches for this 




4. Output And Performance Measures 
NEDSim provides a wide variety of performance measures. They can generally 
categorized as quantity and quality measures. The quantity of matches was measured as 
the number of matches over total number of sailors available (percent sailor match), as 
well as the percent billet match describing the number of matches over the total number 
of billets available. On the other hand, the quality performance indicators are average 
total utility, sailor utility, command utility and, as mentioned above, the percent unstable 
matches for the LP. Ho and Low (2002) also used composite performance measures 
combining total average utility, percent stable matches and percent matched in a product 
function. 
All results were recorded in one result worksheet for further evaluation. Figure 11 
illustrates the excel output page for the original NEDSim design: 
 
 
Figure 11.   Output page of NEDSim (From: Ho, 2002) 
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B. CHANGES IN THE SIMULATION – THE NEW PROFILE GENERATOR 
While keeping the matching mechanisms made intuitive sense, the profile 
generators leading to the preference lists produced by utility functions did not reflect any 
bonus or financial incentive. Therefore some amendments were necessary, to introduce 
the assignment incentive pay in the simulation. 
Assignment Incentive Pay basically represents another element in both profile 
generators and utility functions. An additional pay portion obviously has the opposite 
effect on the utility of sailors and the Navy. While the Navy has to cover an expense, the 
sailor gains additional earnings. The additional preference factor on the sailor side can be 
modeled as an additional element in his utility function, depending on the size of the AIP 
for the billet. An individual billet with a comparably high AIP assigned to it will 
represent a higher AIP utility value to the sailor than a billet with low AIP. To be 
consistent with the original NEDSIM design, the scale for the AIP utility portion was 
chosen to range from 1 to 5 with the following amended Pay-off Matrix for billet 
characteristics: 
 












Excellent Excellent Excellent 
(Billet rate ≥ 2 rates above Sailor 
rate) 
Shore Excellent 5 
High High High 
(Billet rate = 1 rate above Sailor 
rate) 
 High 4 
Average Average Average 
(Billet rate = Sailor rate) 
 Average 3 
Moderate Moderate Low 
(Billet rate  = 1 rate below Sailor 
rate) 
 Moderate 2 
Low Low Extremely Low 
(Billet rate ≤ 2 rates below Sailor 
rate) 
Sea Low 1 
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The profile generator was extended to generate the fifth preference factor with a 
symmetric, centered, discrete probability function. The distribution was assumed to be 
normal. The extended profile was then modeled in a new utility function for the sailor.  
 
Sailor Utility  = αFL (Family Life) + αL (Location) + αJ1 (Promotion) 
+ αJ2 (Shore) + αAIP (AIP) 
where : αFL + αL+ αJ1+ αJ2+ αAIP =1 
 
Due to the high uncertainty about how valuable the additional pay is for the 
individual sailor, the weights of the utility portions of the sailor were still generated 
randomly. 
The appropriate AIP element also extended the command utility function. 
Command Utility = βNEC(NEC) + βpay(Paygrade) + βexp (Experience) 
+ βperf (Performance) + βAIP (AIP) 
where : βNEC + βpay+ βexp+ βperf + βAIP =1  
 
However, the command’s weights weren’t generated randomly but set by Navy Policy 
(allowing the Navy to vary the emphasis on minimizing AIP costs), and varied by 
sensitivity analysis. Moreover, the AIP preference factor in the command utility function 
had to be linked to the sailor’s AIP preference factor because of the earlier mentioned 
inverse utility relationship for a specific sailor-billet match. 
To ensure this relationship, the command AIP value was set to be the maximum 
score (5) plus one, reduced by the sailor’s AIP value (6 – Sailor AIP). This way, every 
match incorporated an inverse utility drawn from AIP for sailors and commands. For 
example, a high AIP attached to the voluntarily acceptance of a potential assignment 
would give the sailor a high utility score from the potential match. If this value is 5, the 
AIP value for the command for that particular match would be automatically set to the 1, 
which is the lowest possible score in that part of the utility function. While this inverse 
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relationship for the AIP portion of both utility functions is established, the weight the 
individual places on AIP is randomized for the sailor and preset according to the 
sensitivity analysis scenario for the command. 
 
C. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
The wide variety of available performance measures offered by the original 
NEDSim clearly exceeded the needs for this simulation. Because the main focus of 
interest was on the success of the simulated Navy assignment process and the effect of 
different AIP policies, only three measures were chosen to provide further insight. 
The most important measure is command utility. The Navy is facing the challenge 
of deciding how to implement the new incentive pay and is interested in determining 
what policy provides the highest payback to the Navy. 
On the other hand, the matching process can also be viewed as successful if the 
percentage of sailors matched is high. As mentioned earlier one priority is voluntary 
assignments, and a high percentage of voluntarily matched sailors represents a high 
percentage of satisfied and productive sailors. 
Finally, a system-immanent performance measure comes automatically using 
linear programming in the matching process. The number of unstable matches needs to be 
minimized to reduce interference with detailers’ assignment decisions. If both the sailor 
and the matched command prefer a different partner to the matched one, they would both 
be likely to interfere and search for another assignment solution. 
The three chosen performance measures are readily provided by the original 
NEDSim layout and can be analyzed for the different scenarios. Excel provides the 






D. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS DESIGN 
Sensitivity analysis generally compares two extreme scenarios to each other and 
to a base case. The results, in terms of command utility, average percent matches and 
average percent of unstable matches, will be reported in part VI of this paper. 
The base case, called “equal”, is a command utility function with equal weights 
on all preference factors. This scenario represents a Navy that draws equally weighted 
utility from quality, performance measures and the AIP expense. Not spending money on 
AIP is as important as the quality of the sailor. The first extreme case, called “money”, 
incorporates a command utility function with a disproportionally high weight on the AIP 
portion. The Navy tries to save money and is less interested in quality and performance 
factors. The other extreme case, “quality”, on the other hand has a disproportionally low 
weight on the AIP portion and represents the Navy’s interest in quality and performance 
rather than saving AIP expenses. Table 7 summarizes the weights for the different 
scenarios: 
 
Table 7. The Command Utility Function Weights in the three scenarios 
 
Scenario βNEC βpay  βexp 
 
βperf βAIP 
Equal 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Money 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 
Quality 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.12 
 
Following the current US Navy detailing process for Enlisted Personnel, a typical 
two weeks requisition cycle was simulated with 60 billets available for 45 sailors. About 
15% of the billets are priority 1 coded. The simulation followed this approach, with 9 out 
of the 60 billets being P 1 billets. These assumptions are consistent with Ho and Low’s 
approach and follow earlier runs conducted by Ng and Soh (2001) and study results by 
Short (2000). Also following the original NEDSIM settings, the preference list length 
was kept at five potential choices. To obtain sufficient data for a statistically significant 
analysis, 100 requisition cycles were simulated and reported. 
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In a second step, the preference list lengths were doubled to ten potential choices 
to possibly improve the original results. Earlier simulations found a fundamental pay-off 
relationship, illustrated by Figure 12, that suggest this change is promising. 
 
 

























% Sailors Matched % P1 Billets Matched % P2 Billets Matched
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VI. RESULTS AND OUTCOMES OF THE SENSITIVITY 
ANALYSIS 
A. OVERALL FINDINGS 
The simulation results and findings proved to be consistent with previous research 
and anecdotal evidence. The “quality“ scenario always showed higher average command 
utility, generally the highest percentage of matches and the lowest percentage of unstable 
matches when the LP is used. “Quality” provides up to 66.6% higher average command 
utility and cuts the unstable matches for the P2/P3 billets in half (significant at 10%-
level). A doubled preference list length furthermore lowers unstable matches significantly 
for P1 billets under “quality”. It also increases the average percentage of matches 
significantly (almost tripled for  “Quality” P2/3 billets). The following two tables 
summarize these results: 
 
Table 8. Simulation results for P1 billets in the three different scenarios (if not stated 



























 DA LP DA LP LP 
Equal (A) 82.1 98.2 24.07 26.6 31.57 
Money (B) 82.55 98.65 15.26 16.72 31.92 
Quality (C) 82.45 97.8 25.42 27.68 31.98 
Significant 
differences 
None None Yes, all Yes, all None 
Double Preference List:     
Money (D) 100 99.45 18.58 18.0 28.53 




Table 9. Simulation results for P2/3 billets in the three different scenarios (if not stated 
otherwise, all differences are significant at the 1%-level) 
 
B. RESULTS IN DETAIL 
Because of the possibly different results from the two matching mechanisms the 
results for command utility and average percent matches will be reported separately and 
summarized in closing. Unstable matches are a linear program symptom only. Section B 
3 of this chapter will consequently report just LP results. 
 
1. Comparison Of Command Utility 
a Results from the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm 
Figure 13 shows the command utility derived from all successfully 
matched sailors to P1 billets in the three scenarios. Although the difference between 
scenarios “equal” and “quality” is hard to identify visually, the lower command utility 































 DA LP DA LP LP 
Equal (A) 17.45 41.8 18.62 16.86 1.13 
Money (B) 17.59 41.58 13.34 14.99 1.18 
Quality (C) 17.68 41.84 19.11 17.34 0.53 
Significant 
differences 







Double Preference List:     
Money (D) 34.1 53.99 25.82 29.0 1.99 
















Figure 13.   DA: Command Utility from Sailors matched to P1 Billets 
 
However, the mean of the command utility in the “quality” scenario is 
indeed about 5.6% higher than in the “equal” scenario. This difference of the means 
proves to be statistically significant even at the 1% level.  
 
Table 10. Two-Sample t-test on Means Assuming Unequal Variances for Command 
Utility of matched P1 Billets using the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm 
 

















t Critical one-tail 2.345332
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.003243
t Critical two-tail 2.600882
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All other mean differences are statistically significant at the 1% level as 
visually indicated by Figure 5. The command utility for “money” is 36.6% lower than for 
“equal”; “quality” shows 66.6% higher command utility than “money”. Table 11 shows 
the corresponding t-tests. 
 
Table 11. Two-Sample t-test on Means Assuming Unequal Variances for Command 




Mean 24.07 15.256 15.256 25.4216
Variance 10.25 4.13158 4.13158 10.32032
Observations 100 100 100 100
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0
df 168 167
t Stat 23.2418 -26.7406
P(T<=t) one-tail 1.15E-54 1.52E-62
t Critical one-tail 2.348752 2.348879
P(T<=t) two-tail 2.29E-54 3.04E-62
t Critical two-tail 2.605411 2.605593
Equal and Money Money and Quality
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When looking at the results for matching the remaining sailors to P2/P3 
billets, the graph shows somewhat different results. 
 
 
Figure 14.   DA: Command Utility from Sailors matched to P2/P3 Billets 
 
Although scenario “money” still shows the lowest values of the three, the 
difference between the other two scenarios is not as big as with the P1 billets. This time 
“quality” shows only 2.5% higher results on average than “equal” and the difference isn’t 
statistically significant. However, the differences from “equal” to “money” (28.4%) and 
“money” to “quality” (43.2%) have p-values very close to zero. 








1 8 15 22 29 36 43 50 57 64 71 78 85 92 99
Equal Money Quality
50 
Table 12. Two-Sample t-test on Means Assuming Unequal Variances for Command 




b Results from the Linear Programming 
When using Linear Programming as the matching procedure for the P1 
billets the results in terms of command utility are similar. 
 
 
Figure 15.   LP: Command Utility from Sailors matched to P1 Billets 
 
Compare Means of
Mean 18.624 19.1056 18.624 13.34 13.34 19.1056
Variance 19.86204 18.56293 19.86204 11.21697 11.21697 18.56293
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 198 184 187
t Stat -0.77693 9.478273 -10.5653
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.219065 6.59E-18 4.65E-21
t Critical one-tail 2.345332 2.346787 2.346451
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.43813 1.32E-17 9.29E-21
t Critical two-tail 2.600882 2.60281 2.602374
Equal and Money Money and QualityEqual and Quality







1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43 49 55 61 67 73 79 85 91 97
Equal Money Quality
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“Quality” shows 4 % higher results on average than “equal” and the 
difference is statistically significant. The differences from “equal” to “money” (37.1 %) 
and “money” to “quality” (65.4 %) again have p-values close to zero. 
 
Table 13. Two-Sample t-test on Means Assuming Unequal Variances for Command 
Utility of matched P1 Billets using Linear Programming 
 
When using Linear Programming to match the remaining sailors to P2 and 
P3 billets, the differences between the scenarios appeared to be significantly smaller than 
the results from the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm, but the statistical significance of the 
differences of the means proved to be similar.  
 
Figure 16.   LP: Command Utility from Sailors matched to P2/P3 Billets 







1 8 15 22 29 36 43 50 57 64 71 78 85 92 99
Equal Money Quality
Compare Means of
Mean 26.602 27.6768 26.602 16.728 16.728 27.6768
Variance 7.038784 8.381533 7.038784 2.918804 2.918804 8.381533
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 197 169 160
t Stat -2.73704 31.29076 -32.5702
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.003383 1.62E-72 8.43E-73
t Critical one-tail 2.345423 2.348615 2.34988
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.006767 3.23E-72 1.69E-72
t Critical two-tail 2.601009 2.605229 2.606903
Equal and Quality Equal and Money Money and Quality
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This time “quality” shows 2.9% higher results on average than “equal” 
and the difference is again not statistically significant. The differences from “equal” to 
“money” (11.1%) and “money” to “quality” (15.7%) have again p-values very close to 
zero but are less than half as big as with the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm. 
 
Table 14. Two-Sample t-test on Means Assuming Unequal Variances for Command 




2. Comparison of Average Percent Matches 
In general, neither the deferred acceptance algorithm nor the linear program 
produced statistically significant different solutions in the three scenarios for preference 
list lengths of five. However, for the sake of completeness, the t-tests for the differences 
of the mean values with assumed unequal variances are given below. 
 
a Results from the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm 
The average percentage matches for the three scenarios “equal”, “money” 
and “quality” did not differ at any meaningful, significant level, as shown in Tables 15 






Mean 16.862 17.3436 16.862 14.989 14.989 17.3436
Variance 20.43288 21.4728 20.43288 15.40402 15.40402 21.4728
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 198 194 193
t Stat -0.74396 3.128762 -3.8774
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.228891 0.001013 7.23E-05
t Critical one-tail 2.345332 2.345723 2.345823
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.457782 0.002026 0.000145
t Critical two-tail 2.600882 2.60141 2.601537
Equal and Quality Equal and Money Money and Quality
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Table 15. Two-Sample t-test on Means Assuming Unequal Variances for Average 




Table 16. Two-Sample t-test on Means Assuming Unequal Variances for Average 





b Results from the Linear Programming 
The matching results using the linear program showed remarkably higher 
results, but did not differ significantly between the different scenarios as mentioned 
above. However, the differences did not yield as high p-values as did the DA results. The 
difference of the means between “money” and “quality” for the P1 billets showed 
significance almost at the 10%-level. The appropriate t-test results are given in Tables 17 
and 18: 
Compare Means of
Mean 0.164238 0.164906 0.164238 0.165129 0.165129 0.164906
Variance 0.000408 0.000421 0.000408 0.000392 0.000392 0.000421
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 198 198 198
t Stat -0.23193 -0.31495 0.078208
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.408415 0.376566 0.468871
t Critical one-tail 2.345332 2.345332 2.345332
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.81683 0.753132 0.937742
t Critical two-tail 2.600882 2.600882 2.600882
Equal and Quality Equal and Money Money and Quality
Compare Means of
Mean 0.174472 0.176753 0.174472 0.175884 0.175884 0.176753
Variance 0.001817 0.00163 0.001817 0.001633 0.001633 0.00163
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 197 197 198
t Stat -0.38854 -0.24041 -0.15213
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.34902 0.40513 0.439619
t Critical one-tail 2.345423 2.345423 2.345332
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.698039 0.810261 0.879238
t Critical two-tail 2.601009 2.601009 2.600882
Equal and Quality Equal and Money Money and Quality
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Table 17. Two-Sample t-test on Means Assuming Unequal Variances for Average 




Table 18. Two-Sample t-test on Means Assuming Unequal Variances for Average 





3. Comparison of Unstable Matches 
In the third performance measurement area, the behavior of the linear program 
with respect to the unstable matches or blocking pairs was of interest under the different 
scenarios. If the Navy uses this matching algorithm in the assignment process, this would 
be an important indicator for sailor and command satisfaction.  
With a preference list length of five, the P1 billet simulation did not return a 
statistically significant difference between the three scenarios. 
Compare Means of
Mean 0.196448 0.19556 0.196448 0.197336 0.197336 0.19556
Variance 6.69E-05 0.000119 6.69E-05 0.000102 0.000102 0.000119
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 183 190 197
t Stat 0.650444 -0.68256 1.192436
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.258111 0.247859 0.117262
t Critical one-tail 2.346897 2.346133 2.345423
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.516221 0.495719 0.234525
t Critical two-tail 2.602956 2.601955 2.601009
Equal and Quality Equal and Money Money and Quality
Compare Means of
Mean 0.418015 0.418437 0.418015 0.415763 0.415763 0.418437
Variance 0.005102 0.005338 0.005102 0.00502 0.00502 0.005338
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 198 198 198
t Stat -0.0413 0.22383 -0.26273
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.483549 0.41156 0.396516
t Critical one-tail 2.345332 2.345332 2.345332
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.967099 0.823121 0.793032
t Critical two-tail 2.600882 2.600882 2.600882
Equal and Quality Equal and Money Money and Quality
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Table 19. Two-Sample t-test on Means Assuming Unequal Variances for Average 




On the other hand the P2/P3 billet simulation showed significant results at the 
10%-level, indicating that the “quality“ scenario will produce a 0.65 percentage points, or 
44.5%, lower proportion of unstable matches compared with the “money“ scenario. 













Figure 17.   LP: Percent of unstable matches with P2/P3 Billets 
 
 
Mean 0.315694 0.319806 0.315694 0.319167 0.319167 0.319806
Variance 0.035396 0.040767 0.035396 0.031924 0.031924 0.040767
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 197 197 195
t Stat -0.14897 -0.13382 -0.0237
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.440866 0.446839 0.490559
t Critical one-tail 1.652625 1.652625 1.652706
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.881733 0.893678 0.981119
t Critical two-tail 1.97208 1.97208 1.972203
Equal and Quality Equal and Money Quality and Money
 
LP: P2/P3 Billets Percent of Untsable  
Matches 





The following section will provide evidence that this positive effect of the 
“quality“ scenario is even bigger with doubled preference lists. 
 
4. Results With Doubled Preference Lists 
a Command Utility 
Average command utility generally increased with the doubled preference 
list length. For P1 billets it accounted for a 20% improvement for the already best 
performing scenario, “quality”; with the P2/P3 billets using the linear program the 
average utility increased by 74.39% in the same scenario. All positive effects on the 




Table 20. Two-Sample t-test on Means Assuming Unequal Variances for Average 
Command Utility of matched P1 Billets using the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm 
and doubled Preference List Lengths (PLL) 
 
 
Compare Means of Money PLL 5 and 10 Quality PLL 5 and 10
Mean 15.256 18.575 25.4216 30.3836 18.575 30.3836
Variance 4.13158 0.39947 10.32032 2.008141 0.39947 2.008141
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 118 136 137
t Stat -15.5922 -14.132 -76.1036
P(T<=t) one-tail 9.73E-31 9.1E-29 2.8E-114
t Critical one-tail 2.358365 2.354082 2.353872
P(T<=t) two-tail 1.95E-30 1.82E-28 5.7E-114
t Critical two-tail 2.618144 2.612469 2.612196
Money and Quality 
PLL 10
57 
Table 21. Two-Sample t-test on Means Assuming Unequal Variances for Average 
Command Utility of matched P2/3 Billets using the Deferred Acceptance 





Table 22. Two-Sample t-test on Means Assuming Unequal Variances for Average 
Command Utility of matched P1 Billets using the Linear Program and doubled 
Preference List Lengths (PLL) 
 
 
Compare Means of Money PLL 5 and 10 Quality PLL 5 and 10
Mean 13.34 25.822 19.1056 32.5364 25.822 32.5364
Variance 11.21697 16.69729 18.56293 20.54358 16.69729 20.54358
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 191 197 196
t Stat -23.625 -21.4772 -11.0027
P(T<=t) one-tail 6.93E-59 8.35E-54 1.55E-22
t Critical one-tail 2.346032 2.345423 2.345523
P(T<=t) two-tail 1.39E-58 1.67E-53 3.09E-22
t Critical two-tail 2.60181 2.601009 2.601155
Money and Quality 
PLL 10
Compare Means of Money PLL 5 and 10 Quality PLL 5 and 10
Mean 16.728 18.005 27.6768 29.9348 18.005 29.9348
Variance 2.918804 0.483712 8.381533 2.112215 0.483712 2.112215
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 131 146 142
t Stat -6.92294 -6.97041 -74.0435
P(T<=t) one-tail 8.91E-11 5.05E-11 1.2E-115
t Critical one-tail 2.355155 2.352162 2.352899
P(T<=t) two-tail 1.78E-10 1.01E-10 2.4E-115
t Critical two-tail 2.613888 2.609922 2.610905
Money and Quality 
PLL 10
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Table 23. Two-Sample t-test on Means Assuming Unequal Variances for Average 
Command Utility of matched P2/3 Billets using the Linear Program and doubled 




b Average Percent Matches 
The effect of the doubled preference list length is even stronger with 
respect to the average percent matches. For the P1 billets under the deferred acceptance 
algorithm, all scenarios are raised to a 100% match (20% of the sailors means 100% of 
the billets are filled) and with the linear program “quality” yields the same effect. The 
scenario “money” is very close with 99.45% matched. 
 
Table 24. Two-Sample t-test on Means Assuming Unequal Variances for Average 
Percent Matches of matched P1 Billets using the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm 




Compare Means of Money PLL 5 and 10 Quality PLL 5 and 10
Mean 14.989 29.003 17.3436 30.2444 29.003 30.2444
Variance 15.40402 19.80272 21.4728 20.74139 19.80272 20.74139
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 195 198 198
t Stat -23.6183 -19.8558 -1.94961
P(T<=t) one-tail 2.09E-59 2.7E-49 0.026317
t Critical one-tail 2.345623 2.345332 2.345332
P(T<=t) two-tail 4.18E-59 5.39E-49 0.052635
t Critical two-tail 2.601282 2.600882 2.600882
Money and Quality 
PLL 10
Compare Means of Money PLL 5 and 10 Quality PLL 5 and 10
Mean 0.165129 0.2 0.164906 0.2
Variance 0.000392 1.84E-16 0.000421 1.84E-16
Observations 100 100 100 100
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0
df 99 99
t Stat -17.6141 -17.1016
P(T<=t) one-tail 1.42E-32 1.29E-31
t Critical one-tail 2.364604 2.364604
P(T<=t) two-tail 2.83E-32 2.57E-31
t Critical two-tail 2.626402 2.626402
No differences
Money and Quality 
PLL 10
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Table 25. Two-Sample t-test on Means Assuming Unequal Variances for Average 
Percent Matches of matched P1 Billets using the Linear Program and doubled 





The average percent matched for the P2/P3 billets with the doubled 
preference list length also improves the most when using the deferred acceptance 
algorithm under the “quality“ scenario. The value increases by 37.42 percentage points 
(211%) and is then very close to the results provided by the linear program. 
 
Table 26. Two-Sample t-test on Means Assuming Unequal Variances for Average 
Percent Matches of matched P2/3 Billets using the Deferred Acceptance 
Algorithm and doubled Preference List Lengths (PLL) 
 
 
Compare Means of Money PLL 5 and 10 Quality PLL 5 and 10
Mean 0.197336 0.198888 0.19556 0.20111 0.198888 0.20111
Variance 0.000102 0.000423 0.000119 2.36E-05 0.000423 2.36E-05
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 144 137 110
t Stat -0.67731 -4.63915 -1.05173
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.249647 4.04E-06 0.147613
t Critical one-tail 2.352517 2.353872 2.360721
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.499294 8.08E-06 0.295226
t Critical two-tail 2.610395 2.612196 2.621273
Money and Quality 
PLL 10
Compare Means of Money PLL 5 and 10 Quality PLL 5 and 10
Mean 0.175884 0.341043 0.176753 0.551109 0.341043 0.551109
Variance 0.001633 0.001775 0.00163 0.005468 0.001775 0.005468
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 198 153 157
t Stat -28.2913 -44.4348 -24.6831
P(T<=t) one-tail 8.67E-72 1.18E-89 3.21E-56
t Critical one-tail 2.345332 2.350971 2.350334
P(T<=t) two-tail 1.73E-71 2.36E-89 6.41E-56
t Critical two-tail 2.600882 2.60834 2.607503
Money and Quality 
PLL 10
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Table 27. Two-Sample t-test on Means Assuming Unequal Variances for Average 
Percent Matches of matched P2/3 Billets using the Linear Program and doubled 




c Percent Unstable Matches 
As previously mentioned the increase in preference list length increases 
the difference between the scenarios “money” and “quality” in terms of unstable matches 
for the P2/3 billets. In fact, the “quality“ scenario yields 0.8 percentage points fewer 
blocking pairs than the “money“ scenario. Additionally, for the P1 billets a statistically 
significantly lower number of blocking pairs occur with “quality”, a distinction that 
wasn’t observable earlier with the shorter preference list length. 
 
Table 28. Two-Sample t-test on Means Assuming Unequal Variances for Average 
Percent of Unstable Matches of matched P1 Billets using the Linear Program and 
doubled Preference List Lengths (PLL) 
 
Compare Means of Money PLL 5 and 10 Quality PLL 5 and 10
B D C E D E
Mean 0.415763 0.539895 0.418437 0.551109 0.539895 0.551109
Variance 0.00502 0.005993 0.005338 0.005468 0.005993 0.005468
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 196 198 198
t Stat -11.8281 -12.7627 -1.04748
P(T<=t) one-tail 5.17E-25 6.49E-28 0.148077
t Critical one-tail 2.345523 2.345332 2.345332
P(T<=t) two-tail 1.03E-24 1.3E-27 0.296155
t Critical two-tail 2.601155 2.600882 2.600882
Money and Quality 
PLL 10
Compare Means of Money PLL 5 and 10 Quality PLL 5 and 10
Mean 0.319167 0.285297 0.319806 0.246444 0.285297 0.246444
Variance 0.031924 0.03524 0.040767 0.033115 0.03524 0.033115
Observations 100 99 100 100 99 100
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 196 196 197
t Stat 1.303436 2.698967 1.482215
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.096978 0.003781 0.06994
t Critical one-tail 1.652666 1.652666 1.652625
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.193955 0.007563 0.139881
t Critical two-tail 1.972139 1.972139 1.97208




Table 29. Two-Sample t-test on Means Assuming Unequal Variances for Average 
Percent of Unstable Matches of matched P2/3 Billets using the Linear Program 






C. COMPARISON WITH PAST RESULTS 
All comparable results are generally consistent with earlier research. Linear 
programming as the matching mechanism introduces the disadvantage of blocking pairs 
but finds solutions with a higher percentage of matches and a higher average command 
utility for P1 billets. The significantly better performance of the DA for the P2/3 billets in 
terms of average utility found by Lo and How (2002) is reversed in the “money“ 
scenario. This opposite trend is even more significant with doubled preference list 
lengths. Although it is hardly possible to predict a trend from two values only, the trade-
off between preference list length and percent matches found in other research with the 
deferred acceptance algorithm is again visible. 
With the generally similar results as in previous simulations it seems to be 
appropriate to infer the same earlier shown superiority (Robards, 2001) over the average 
human matched detailing for NEDSim as a simulation tool. The results from the 
sensitivity analysis should provide a good approximation for the real world assignment 
process. 
Compare Means of Money PLL 5 and 10 Quality PLL 5 and 10
Mean 0.011795 0.019926 0.005249 0.011901 0.019926 0.011901
Variance 0.001257 0.001892 0.000741 0.000963 0.001892 0.000963
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0
df 190 195 179
t Stat -1.44894 -1.61144 1.502058
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.074502 0.054351 0.067422
t Critical one-tail 1.652913 1.652706 1.653411
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.149004 0.108701 0.134844
t Critical two-tail 1.97253 1.972203 1.973303
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 
A. CONCLUSION 
Independent from the matching procedure used, the results of the sensitivity 
analysis give strong evidence that a Navy that is mainly interested in saving money and 
reducing expenses for an Assignment Incentive Pay will yield much lower overall utility 
from the sailors matched to billets. A strong emphasis on minimizing AIP, costs prevents 
matches with higher qualified sailors and reduces the command utility the Navy receives 
from the matched sailors. On the other hand, a comparably low weight on the AIP cost 
factor enables matches with higher command utility than an equally weighted utility 
function. This is especially valid in the case of the P1 billets, where the pool of sailors is 
matched to a limited number of billets. The advantage of the “quality” scenario over the 
“money” scenario is smaller for the P2/P3, billets but still shows a remarkable 15.7% 
improvement in case of the LP results. 
The higher performance in terms of average percent matches under the “quality“ 
scenario, compared with the “money“ scenario, is only obvious with a doubled preference 
list length. Here, “quality” accounted for a 61.6% increase in average percent matches 
(21 percentage points) under the deferred acceptance algorithm for P2/3 billets, which 
indicates a more than significant improvement of the assignment process. 
When employing the linear program as a matching algorithm, the scenario 
“quality” produced significantly lower blocking pairs for P2/3 billets. 
In general, the scenario “quality” outperforms the scenario “money” over all the 
chosen measures of performance; the AIP cost is the only downside. The command utility 
function included the monetary aspects of the AIP from the Navy’s standpoint; the 
average command utility increased, indicating the more qualified sailors outweighed the 
AIP cost, given the utility function used here.  
Consequently, from a simulation perspective, introducing AIP will lead me to 
predict a more successful matching process and a higher utility derived for the Navy. 
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This will be especially valid if the Navy emphasizes the quality of the matched sailors 
over the possible AIP expenses. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The primary recommendation from this research is to emphasize  the quality and 
performance of a sailor and to pay AIP at a sufficient level to attract qualified sailors. In a 
closed bidding procedure, the matched sailor might be attracted by AIP but may not be 
the sailor with the highest overall utility to the Navy. Therefore the AIP caps need to be 
high enough to attract the right applicants. 
Although the results of this study are significant and leave little room for 
misinterpretation, they are derived from the Enlisted Personnel assignment process in a 
simulation environment. As mentioned earlier, the current process does not use 
automated assignment procedures like linear programming or the deferred acceptance 
algorithm. However, if the internal decision process follows the same underlying 
preference factors the real world results might not be too different from the virtual 
environment of this simulation.  
Another interesting aspect might be the psychological affect of a low or high 
command weight on the AIP portion as simulated by the “quality” and “money” 
scenarios. A sailor who expects that the Navy does not emphasize limiting the money it 
spends for AIP might be more likely to enter maximum bids in the AIP bidding process, 
and therefore increase the overall expenses for the incentive. On the other hand, a Navy 
that is very much interested in saving AIP money might discourage some sailors from 
bidding altogether. These effects could very well influence the real life results, but they 
are well beyond the capabilities of NEDSim, and therefore beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
As a further step to examine the effect of an assignment incentive pay on the 
overall utility of the Navy, a real world validation of the simulation results is certainly 
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appropriate. The econometrician’s model should have a sailor’s productivity measure as 
the dependent variable and the level of the AIP as well as the sailor’s perception of the 
appropriateness of the AIP level among the explanatory variables. Another approach 
could use retention rates as the dependent variable. This would be a much easier 
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APPENDIX: ACRONYMS 
AIP Assignment Incentive Pay 
BUPERS Bureau of Personnel 
CAN Center For Naval Analyses 
CCCs Command Career Counselors  
CINCLANTFLT Combat Commander Atlantic 
CINCPACFLT Combat Commander Pacific 
CINCUSNAVEUR Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe 
CNO Chief of Naval Operations 
CNPC Commander Navy Personnel Command 
DIMS Distributive Incentive Management System  
DOD Department of Defense 
EAIS Enlisted Assignment Information System  
EB Enlistment Bonus 
EMF Enlisted Master File 
EPMAC Enlisted Placement Management Center 
EPRES Enlisted Personnel Requisition system 
Global CONOPS Global Concept of Operations 
JASS Job Advertising and Selection System  
MCA Manning Control Authority 
MPT Manpower, Personnel and Training 
NEC Navy Enlisted Code 
NMP Navy Manning Plan 
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NPC Navy Personnel Command 
NPRST Navy Personnel Research, Studies & Technology 
OPNAV Staff of Chief of Naval Operations 
PCS Permanent Change of Station  
PRD Projection Rotation Date  
SRB Selective Reenlistment Bonus 
TFMMS Total Force Manpower Management System 
BMF Billet Master File 
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